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Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22854
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| Title: | | Optimal Trading Mechanisms for an Informed Seller  |
| Authors: | | Tisljar, Rolf |
| Issue Date: | | 2002 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2002,33 |
| Abstract: | | We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an undominated perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model the seller gives the object to the person who values the object most, and receives a transfer payment from each potential buyer such that all ex-ante expected rents are extracted from the buyers. |
| Subjects: | | informed principal mechanism design |
| JEL: | | D82 C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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