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dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden_US
dc.contributor.authorApesteguia, Joséen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:16Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22840-
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports an experiment on a location game, the so-called ?Price-Competition on the Circle.? There are n symmetric firms equidistantly located on a circle. Consumers are uniformly distributed. Each consumer buys one and only one unit from that firm whose price, including the cost of transportation, is the lowest, provided such a price is below a maximum willingness to pay. Experiments, extended over 200 periods, were run with 3, 4, and 5 participants. Subjects did not receive any information about the relationship between prices and profits, but they received feedback on prices and profits of two neighbors after each period. The evaluation compares predictions derived from imitation equilibrium (Selten and Ostmann 2001) and Cournot equilibrium, as well as symmetric joint-profit maximization. The results qualitatively favor imitation equilibrium, as long as no cooperation is observed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2002,19en_US
dc.subject.jelR32en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordImitationen_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordLocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.subject.stwImitationswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwRäumliche Preistheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleExperimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374136564en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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