EconStor >
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRoider, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:14Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837-
dc.description.abstractIn a holdup framework, I provide conditions under which simple delegation of authority is a solution to the complete-contracting problem even though ex-post actions are ex-ante contractible, and unlimited transfer payments are feasible. In particular, delegation turns out to be optimal if the payoff functions of the parties satisfy certain separability and symmetry conditions, and the parties face an underinvestment problem. This result is extended to the case of potential overinvestment and to multi-dimensional effort provision. Besides providing a complete-contracting rationale for delegation, the findings contribute to the foundation of incomplete contracts and the property-rights theory of the firm.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2003,8en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordauthorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordholdupen_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperative Führungen_US
dc.subject.stwDezentrale Organisationen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDelegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contracten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374460566en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
bgse8_2003.pdf443.91 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.