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Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bös, Dieter | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kolmar, Martin | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T15:10:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T15:10:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2003 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Anarchy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Contests | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Redistribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommensumverteilung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verteilungskonflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Anarchie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Aggressiveness and Redistribution | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 374458871 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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