Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835
Authors: 
Bös, Dieter
Kolmar, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,2
Abstract: 
In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market.
Subjects: 
Anarchy
Contests
Redistribution
JEL: 
D30
D74
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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