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Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835
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| Title: | | Aggressiveness and Redistribution  |
| Authors: | | Bös, Dieter Kolmar, Martin |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,2 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market. |
| Subjects: | | Anarchy Contests Redistribution |
| JEL: | | D30 D74 D23 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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