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Title:Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior PDF Logo
Authors:Burkhard Schipper
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,4
Abstract:Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common- Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games.
Subjects:imitation
price-taking behavior
lattice theory
stochastic stability
JEL:C72
D21
L13
D43
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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