Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22832 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 4/2003
Publisher: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Abstract: 
Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common- Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games.
Subjects: 
imitation
price-taking behavior
lattice theory
stochastic stability
JEL: 
C72
D21
L13
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
277.95 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.