EconStor >
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22831
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, Tiboren_US
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:10Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22831-
dc.description.abstractThis article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior. Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computerized bids. Three treatments were considered which varied with the conditions of information feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics. Finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of the individual bidding behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2003,3en_US
dc.subject.jelC12en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC13en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirst-price sealed-bid auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordindependent private value modelen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomputerized competitorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbidding theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.titleIndividual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374459304en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
bgse3_2003.pdf224.97 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.