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Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22827
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| Title: | | The Delegation Perspective on Representative Democracy  |
| Authors: | | Hain, Roland Mitra, Manipushpak |
| Issue Date: | | 2002 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2002,17 |
| Abstract: | | Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information gathering. We show that there is an optimal assembly size that would be chosen at a constitutional stage. This implies a relationship between assembly and constituency size. We then compared this relationship to actual data. Fitting a single parameter to the data, we show that our model can explain the actual relationship between assembly and constituency size quite well. |
| Subjects: | | Constitutional Design Representative Democracy Parliament Size Information Costs |
| JEL: | | D72 P16 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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