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Title:The Delegation Perspective on Representative Democracy PDF Logo
Authors:Hain, Roland
Mitra, Manipushpak
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:Bonn econ discussion papers 2002,17
Abstract:Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information gathering. We show that there is an optimal assembly size that would be chosen at a constitutional stage. This implies a relationship between assembly and constituency size. We then compared this relationship to actual data. Fitting a single parameter to the data, we show that our model can explain the actual relationship between assembly and constituency size quite well.
Subjects:Constitutional Design
Representative Democracy
Parliament Size
Information Costs
JEL:D72
P16
D82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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