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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 15/2002
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.
Schlagwörter: 
Regulation
Asymmetric Information
Budget Constraint
JEL: 
H42
D82
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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