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dc.contributor.authorFeess, Eberharden_US
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, Gerden_US
dc.contributor.authorWalzl, Markusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:06Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22824-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We fully characterize the equilibrium strategies for this auction format and show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2002,14en_US
dc.subject.jelD88en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAll-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontesten_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric allocation ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWhen Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicapsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374125317en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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