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Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22823
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| Title: | | Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction  |
| Authors: | | Roider, Andreas |
| Issue Date: | | 2002 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2002,12 |
| Abstract: | | In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the foundation of the property-rights theory: I characterize under which circumstances its predictions are correct when trade is contractible. Second, I study how the optimal use of the incentive instruments depends on the environment. This is in the spirit of the multitasking literature. Finally, the model produces implications of the property-rights theory that are empirically testable. |
| Subjects: | | Property Rights Incomplete Contracts Specific Investments |
| JEL: | | L22 D23 L14 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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