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dc.contributor.authorFilipova, Liliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:09:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:09:09Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22807-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the implications of insurers? offering a voluntary monitoring technology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or what quality of information to reveal. It is also allowed for the possibility that high risk individuals might mimic low risk individuals. The resulting market equilibrium is characterized and it is shown, that it will never be optimal for insureds to reject the monitoring technology and that under certain conditions, which are specified in the paper, it will be optimal for them to reveal complete information. Concerning the welfare effects both low risk and high risk individuals will always be better off. Unless it is optimal for individuals to reveal complete information, an all-ornothing nature of the monitoring technology will not be efficient.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg 284en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivacyen_US
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk classificationen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous information acquisitionen_US
dc.titleEndogenous Information and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn511472366en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Universität Augsburg

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