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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793
  

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dc.contributor.authorFilipova, Liliaen_US
dc.contributor.authorWelzel, Peteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg 270en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation moral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen_US
dc.titleReducing Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Cars with Black Boxesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn481665668en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Universität Augsburg

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