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Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Augsburg >
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Universität Augsburg >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Filipova, Lilia | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Welzel, Peter | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T15:09:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T15:09:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg 270 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | information moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | adverse selection | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | insurance | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Reducing Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Cars with Black Boxes | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 481665668 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Universität Augsburg
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| 270.pdf | | 197.89 kB | Adobe PDF |
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