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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 13/07
Verlag: 
Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dresden
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper analyses the links between a binding minimum wage and union bargaining. A dual labour market model is developed where the first sector outcome is characterised by bargaining between unions and firms, while in the second sector firms have to pay a statutory minimum wage. It is shown that a minimum wage increase has negative employment effects only if the bargaining outcome is described by the Nash solution. However, this result does not hold if the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is applied to model union bargaining. A higher minimum wage can then lead to more employment in the unionised sector and to a lower unemployment rate.
Schlagwörter: 
Minimum wages
union bargaining
Nash approach
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
JEL: 
J30
C78
J51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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