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Technische Universität Dresden >
Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Technische Universität Dresden >
Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, TU Dresden >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22750
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| Title: | | Licensing by a monopolist and unionized labor market  |
| Authors: | | Mukherjee, Soma Broll, Udo Mukherjee, Arijit |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Dresden discussion paper in economics 09/07 |
| Abstract: | | We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under the former situation. We also show that licensing by the monopolist is profitable under both quantity and price competition, and the incentive for licensing is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Our qualitative results hold even with decentralized unions. |
| Subjects: | | Licensing Labor union Price competition Quantity competition |
| JEL: | | O34 L13 D43 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, TU Dresden
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