Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22743
Authors: 
Sülzle, Kai
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Dresden discussion paper in economics 02/07
Abstract: 
This paper presents a duopoly model of e-business technology adoption. A leader and a follower benefit from a new ebusiness technology with uncertain quality depending on its innovation and adoption cost and both firms' adoption timing. When innovation and adoption require large set-up costs, the leader favors quick adoption by the follower. The follower prefers either late or no adoption. This is due to a delayed firstmover benefit which stems from an innovators' capability to impose a new technology standard. It is shown that inter-firm adoption subsidies are a viable tool to quicken adoption.
Subjects: 
Electronic Business
Adoption
Innovation
Network Effects
JEL: 
L1
O31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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