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dc.contributor.authorStrulik, Holgeren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:59:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:59:52Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22462-
dc.description.abstractThis article shows within a simple growth model how the make up of society affects economic performance when property rights are unenforceable. It investigates behavior of non-cooperative social groups that consume, produce, and appropriate resources either peacefully or through contest. For the case of symmetric groups it is shown that economic growth is generated only in peaceful societies. For the case of asymmetric groups rebel-equilibria are investigated in which a large majority behaves peacefully although challenged by an aggressive minority. In each case it is shown how the possibility of conflict and its intensity and the rate of economic growth depend on social fractionalizaton, general productivity of the economy, and the ease at which resources are appropriated. A final part extends the analysis towards behavior of non-benevolent social elites.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cHannoveren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeitrag |x350en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelO11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSocial Conflicten
dc.subject.keywordSocial Fractionalizationen
dc.subject.keywordProperty Rightsen
dc.subject.keywordStagnationen
dc.subject.keywordGrowthen
dc.titleSocial Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn519877845en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:han:dpaper:dp-350en

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