Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2244
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dc.contributor.authorSander, Birgiten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:13:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:13:52Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2244-
dc.description.abstractGovernments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidiesand pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via bindingcommitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental)and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debtcompromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated designof contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguardagainst opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs andstill does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policyquestion is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holduppotential or if governments should not co-operate with market agentsbut commit to policy rules.-
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Papers |x901-
dc.subject.jelC71-
dc.subject.jelC78-
dc.subject.jelD82-
dc.subject.jelH54-
dc.subject.jelK12-
dc.subject.jelP20-
dc.subject.jelP30-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.stwWohnungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWohnungsbaufinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivatisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTransaktionskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNeue Bundesländeren_US
dc.titleStrategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetzen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:901-
dc.identifier.printppn268012466en_US

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