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Title:Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz PDF Logo
Authors:Sander, Birgit
Issue Date:1998
Series/Report no.:Kiel Working Papers 901
Abstract:Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated design of contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs and still does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policy question is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holdup potential or if governments should not co-operate with market agents but commit to policy rules.
JEL:C71
C78
D82
H54
K12
P20
P30
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW

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