Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22409
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dc.contributor.authorLütje, Torbenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:59:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:59:23Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22409-
dc.description.abstractBased on a questionnaire survey the paper distinguishes between herding asset managers who try to be good and non-herding asset managers who try to be better than their competitors. It provides evidence for reputational herding and discusses herding managers' working effort, preferred sources of information and investment horizon. Additionally, their risk taking behavior including their investment behavior in short-term tournament scenarios is analyzed. It is found that herding managers assess themselves as generally more risk averse than non-herding managers, but in the tournament they are willing to take more risk. This finding is ascribable to their fear of falling out of the herd.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionspapiere des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Hannover |x297en_US
dc.subject.jelG23en_US
dc.subject.jelG14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInstitutional investorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordherdingen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournament hypothesisen_US
dc.titleTo Be Good or To Be Better: Asset Managers' Attitudes Towards Herdingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn389321451en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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