Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22382
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dc.contributor.authorBischoff, Ivoen_US
dc.contributor.authorGohout, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:57:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:57:54Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22382-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the accuracy of the tax projections of West German states from a publicchoice perspective. It argues that state governments have the possibility and face incentives tomanipulate tax projections. Evidence for the years 1992 – 2002 reveals a general upward biasin tax projections in election as well as non-election years. The degree of overestimation ishigher, the less popular the incumbent party is. Partisanship and elections have no significantinfluence. To improve external control of state governments in the budget process, the processof tax projections must be made transparent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |cGießenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFinanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere |x74en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax projectionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical partiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbudget processen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic expendituresen_US
dc.titleTax projections in German states – manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn518816915en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:jlufwa:74-

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