Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22344
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dc.contributor.authorKrause, Günteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:57:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:57:21Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22344-
dc.description.abstractThe present paper investigates the neglected topic of budgeting rules for public bureaucraciesperforming governmental activities within predetermined budgets under rules governingexpenditure levels and composition. We analyze the optimal budgeting scheme, if thebureaucracy has superior information vis – vis the policymaker. It is tasked with supplyingdifferent types of public goods and is subject to costly audits. The optimal budgeting schemefor the bureaucracy is determined. It is shown that it crucially depends on the level of auditingcosts. The same holds for the extent of discretion given to the bureaucracy about levels andcomposition of public expenditures.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWürzburg economic papers |x51en_US
dc.subject.jelH61en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwBürokratietheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzkontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn393702758en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wuewep:51-

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