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Title:On the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric information PDF Logo
Authors:Krause, Günter
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Würzburg economic papers 51
Abstract:The present paper investigates the neglected topic of budgeting rules for public bureaucracies performing governmental activities within predetermined budgets under rules governing expenditure levels and composition. We analyze the optimal budgeting scheme, if the bureaucracy has superior information vis – vis the policymaker. It is tasked with supplying different types of public goods and is subject to costly audits. The optimal budgeting scheme for the bureaucracy is determined. It is shown that it crucially depends on the level of auditing costs. The same holds for the extent of discretion given to the bureaucracy about levels and composition of public expenditures.
JEL:H61
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, Lst. f. VWL, Geld u. internat. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Universität Würzburg

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