EconStor >
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Tübingen >
Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22086
  
Title:Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation : An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution PDF Logo
Authors:Güth, Werner
Stadler, Manfred
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 282
Abstract:Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependence, i.e. of the two "shadows".
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18264
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
282.pdf102.14 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22086

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.