EconStor >
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (CAU) >
Department of Economics, Universität Kiel  >
Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22063
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTraub, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorSeidl, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Ulrichen_US
dc.contributor.authorLevati, Maria Vittoriaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:13:55Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:13:55Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-200910201801-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22063-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates distributive justice using a fourfold experimental design : The ignorance and the risk scenarios are combined with the self-concern and the umpire modes. We study behavioral switches between self-concern and umpire mode and investigate the goodness of ten standards of behavior. In the ignorance scenario, subjects became on average less inequality averse as umpires. A within-subjects analysis shows that about one half became less inequality averse, one quarter became more inequality averse and one quarter left its behavior unchanged as umpires. In the risk scenario, subjects become on average more inequality averse in their umpire roles. A within-subjects analysis shows that half of them became more inequality averse, one quarter became less inequality averse, and one quarter left its behavior unchanged as umpires. As to the standards of behavior, several prominent ones (leximin, leximax, Gini, Cobb-Douglas) experienced but poor support, while expected utility, Boulding's hypothesis, the entropy social welfare function, and randomization preference enjoyed impressive acceptance. For the risk scenario, the tax standard of behavior joins the favorite standards of behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherChristian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2003,03en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDistributive justiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordincome distributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordveil of ignoranceen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerfassungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFriedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding - or Somebody Else?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn364342544en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cauewp:785-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW
Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
EWP-2003-03.pdf729.01 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.