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dc.contributor.authorStoschek, Barbaraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:13:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:13:36Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22029-
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses a political-economy framework to analyze what consequences the exogenous introduction of a quantitative restriction on total emissions in a small open economy has on the stringency of domestic trade policy. The question is whether and to what extent the government, if it takes different lobby groups´ interests into consideration, has an incentive to compensate the polluting industry for stricter environmental regulations by granting higher protection to it. It turns out that the government will indeed tend to increase subsidization of the industry affected by environmental regulation. This compensation will even be more than complete as long as environmental interests are taken into account. Hence, contrary to what might be expected, a net benefit for the polluting sector arises from environmental restrictions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2007,13en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.jelQ52en_US
dc.subject.jelF18en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental Regulationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInternational Competitivenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordTrade Policyen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltauflageen_US
dc.subject.stwProtektionismusen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustriesubventionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaftspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn534223036en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cauewp:5612-
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel

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