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Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (CAU) >
Department of Economics, Universität Kiel >
Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22029
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Stoschek, Barbara | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T14:13:36Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T14:13:36Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22029 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper uses a political-economy framework to analyze what consequences the exogenous introduction of a quantitative restriction on total emissions in a small open economy has on the stringency of domestic trade policy. The question is whether and to what extent the government, if it takes different lobby groups´ interests into consideration, has an incentive to compensate the polluting industry for stricter environmental regulations by granting higher protection to it. It turns out that the government will indeed tend to increase subsidization of the industry affected by environmental regulation. This compensation will even be more than complete as long as environmental interests are taken into account. Hence, contrary to what might be expected, a net benefit for the polluting sector arises from environmental restrictions. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2007,13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F18 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Environmental Regulations | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | International Competitiveness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Political Economy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Trade Policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umweltauflage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Protektionismus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Industriesubvention | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationaler Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 534223036 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:cauewp:5612 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel
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