Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22022 
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dc.contributor.authorvon Döllen, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorRequate, Tillen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:13:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:13:32Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22022-
dc.description.abstractWe study long-term incentives for polluting and regulated firms to invest in advanced abatement technologies, when some new technology is available but an even better technology will be expected in the future. Firms can invest only once. We find that depending on the adoption fixed costs all possible combinations of investment patters can occur in social optimum. Further we show that if the regulator anticipates the arrival of the new technology he can decentralize socially optimal allocation by charging Pigouvian tax or issuing tradable permits through announcing his policy and setting ex post optimal policy levels, after firms have invested.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel University, Department of Economics |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Working Paper |x2007-04en
dc.subject.jelQ55en
dc.subject.jelL5en
dc.subject.jelO31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEmission taxesen
dc.subject.keywordtradable permitsen
dc.subject.keywordoption value theoryen
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordPoisson distributionen
dc.titleEnvironmental Policy and Incentives to Invest in Advanced Abatement Technology if Arrival of Future Technology is Uncertain - Extended Version-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn527149152en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cauewp:5532en

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