Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985
Authors: 
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2004,09
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.
Subjects: 
exclusive dealing
common agency
international trade
competition policy
JEL: 
L42
F12
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
626.18 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.