|
EconStor >
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (CAU) >
Department of Economics, Universität Kiel >
Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985
|
| | |
| Title: | | Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets  |
| Authors: | | Raff, Horst Schmitt, Nicolas |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2004,09 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes. |
| Subjects: | | exclusive dealing common agency international trade competition policy |
| JEL: | | L42 F12 F13 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|