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Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21975
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| Title: | | Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs  |
| Authors: | | Willmann, Gerald |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2003,10 |
| Abstract: | | Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability. |
| Subjects: | | trade policy political economy representative democracy |
| JEL: | | D72 F10 F13 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-200911022624 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel
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