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Title:Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs PDF Logo
Authors:Willmann, Gerald
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2003,10
Abstract:Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.
Subjects:trade policy
political economy
representative democracy
JEL:D72
F10
F13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-200911022624
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, CAU Kiel

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