Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517
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dc.contributor.authorMariotti, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorManzini, Paolaen_US
dc.contributor.authorFella, Giulioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:23:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:23:07Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x439en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddivorceen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon transferabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwEherechten_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwScheidungen_US
dc.titleDoes Divorce Law Matter?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn845016660en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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