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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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| Title: | | Does Divorce Law Matter?  |
| Authors: | | Mariotti, Marco Manzini, Paola Fella, Giulio |
| Issue Date: | | 2002 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion paper series 439 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. |
| Subjects: | | Bargaining divorce non transferability |
| JEL: | | C78 J12 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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| dp439.pdf | | 538.37 kB | Adobe PDF |
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