Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517
Authors: 
Mariotti, Marco
Manzini, Paola
Fella, Giulio
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 439
Abstract: 
In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
divorce
non transferability
JEL: 
C78
J12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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