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dc.contributor.authorSchnedler, Wendelinen_US
dc.contributor.authorSunde, Uween_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:22:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:22:54Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21493-
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently, the agent can improve his future bargaining position, which gives the principal an incentive to retain sufficient control over the agent?s actions. Using respective one-period contracts, the principal can implement the efficient outcome while ?selling the shop? to the agent is sub-optimal. This provides an argument for integration if the boundary of the firm is defined by control rights rather than the entitlement to revenues.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion paper series 464en_US
dc.subject.jelL23en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelL33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordhidden actionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous outside optionen_US
dc.subject.keywordauthorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordoutsourcingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Unternehmungen_US
dc.subject.stwOrganisationsstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwOutsourcingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe Hold-Down Problem and the Boundaries of the Firm: Lessons from a Hidden Action Model with Endogenous Outside Optionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn349337101en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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