Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21459 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 780
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide "stepping stones" into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: Their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60 percent. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of adverse selection into temporary employment.
Schlagwörter: 
temporary work
contract-based incentives
absenteeism
overtime
moral hazard
career concerns
JEL: 
C25
M50
J41
J24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
352.83 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.