Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21434
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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten_US
dc.contributor.authorFalk, Arminen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:22:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:22:22Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21434-
dc.description.abstractDuring the last two decades economists have made much progress in understandingincentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes inbehaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x507en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial approvalen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordintrinsic motivationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwIntrinsische Motivationen_US
dc.titlePsychological Foundations of Incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn845578618en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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