Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21392 
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dc.contributor.authorHeckman, James Josephen
dc.contributor.authorHeinrich, Carolyn J.en
dc.contributor.authorSmith, Jeffrey A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:21:58Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:21:58Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21392-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are small. We find evidence that centersrespond to performance standards.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x525en
dc.subject.jelC31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordperformance standardsen
dc.subject.keywordreinventing governmenten
dc.subject.keywordevaluationen
dc.subject.keywordJTPAen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwWeiterbildungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Verwaltungen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen
dc.titleThe Performance of Performance Standards-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn845649221en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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