Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259
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dc.contributor.authorAlbrecht, Jamesen_US
dc.contributor.authorvan Ours, Jan C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:20:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:20:49Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers useeducation as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less isotherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lowereducational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, sowe conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x399en_US
dc.subject.jelI20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRecruitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwSch├Ątzungen_US
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen_US
dc.titleUsing Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn844742430en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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