Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21198
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Wauthy, Xavier | en |
dc.contributor.author | Zenou, Yves | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:20:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:20:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21198 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a continuum of workers ranked according to their abilities to acquire educationand two firms with different technologies that imperfectly compete in wages to attract theseworkers. Once employed, each worker bears an education cost proportional to his/her initialability, this cost being higher in the high-technology firm. At the Nash equilibrium, we showthat the unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. We then studydifferent policies that subsidy either the education cost or wages and compare them. Wefound that the first best allocation can only be implemented by selective policies. We thenanalyze second best non-selective policies that do not discriminate between workers andfirms and show that, in terms of welfare, subsidizing education costs or wages is strictlyequivalent. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x340 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H20 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Nash equilibrium in wages | en |
dc.subject.keyword | heterogeneous workers and firms | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inequality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment policies | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarkt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Humankapital | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollkommener Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarktpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Qualifikation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | How Does Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market Affect Unemployment Policies? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 844093742 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.