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dc.contributor.authorZoega, Gylfien_US
dc.contributor.authorFrancesconi, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorBooth, Alison L.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:19:58Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:19:58Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21160-
dc.description.abstractIn oligopsonistic labour markets, firms have some market power, and a wedge is created between wages and marginal product. When oligopsonistic firms' production technology requires generally trained workers, firms may therefore receive part of the returns to general training and be willing to pay for it despite its general nature. However this outcome is not efficient, in the sense that too few workers are trained and workers who are hired receive too little training. We consider how different institutions can affect this inefficiency. Industry-level minimum wages can remove the training inefficiency and provide workers with the right incentives to invest in general training. A training subsidy to firms can also be used to achieve first-best. Trade unions might also remedy the market failure, in two ways. First, if an industry-wide union has a direct say in the training decision and maximises the utility of a representative worker, it will choose the efficient level of training intensity. Second, firmspecific unions, through raising relative wages and reducing turnover, can increase training intensity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion paper series 618en_US
dc.subject.jelE32en_US
dc.subject.jelJ23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ24en_US
dc.subject.jelJ54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtrainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopsonyen_US
dc.subject.keywordunionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wagesen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Bildungsarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsnachfrageen_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwBerufsbildungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwGewerkschaftliche Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgraden_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOligopsony, Institutions and the Efficiency of General Trainingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn361404751en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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