Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21156 
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en
dc.contributor.authorWeiss, Avien
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:19:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:19:56Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21156-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in thegranting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respectto allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internalcontrol) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitationson eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions onallocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factorscombine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider various extensions such asintertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-aversion, and ?fuzziness? in declarationsregarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x302en
dc.subject.jelH59en
dc.subject.jelJ68en
dc.subject.jelJ61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAmnestyen
dc.subject.keywordimmigrationen
dc.subject.keywordillegal immigrationen
dc.subject.keywordborder controlsen
dc.subject.keywordinternal controlsen
dc.subject.stwIllegale Einwanderungen
dc.subject.stwStraffreiheiten
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA Theory of Immigration Amnesties-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn843885203en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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