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dc.contributor.authorPostel-Vinay, Fabienen_US
dc.contributor.authorCahuc, Pierreen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:19:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:19:31Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21110-
dc.description.abstractMany European labor markets are characterized by heavy employment protection taxes and the widespread use of fixed-duration contracts. The simultaneous use of these two policy instruments seems somewhat contradictory since the former primarily aims at limiting job destruction whereas the latter clearly intensifies it. In this paper, we use a simple matching model with endogenous job destructions to analyze the impact of a combination of the two policies. We find that the political support of insiders to firing restrictions does not necessarily worsen unemployment. In fact, it may be the willingness of a majority of workers to support the combination of two instruments with opposite effects on job destruction and job creation that increase unemployment and deteriorates efficiency. Moreover, we argue, that the concentration of firm ownership is likely to influence labor market regulations. We show that the preferred point of a majority of workers is a very flexible labor market, without any firing cost when profits are evenly distributed across the labor force (which portrays a situation where firm ownership is extremely dispersed), whereas a combination of job protection and temporary jobs is preferred by workers when the share of profits that they earn is zero (which corresponds to a situation where firm ownership is concentrated among a few shareholders not participating in the labor market).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion paper series 260en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelJ38en_US
dc.subject.jelJ23en_US
dc.subject.jelH29en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfixed duration contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordjob destructionen_US
dc.subject.keywordemployment protectionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwBefristeter Arbeitsvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschäftigungseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTemporary Jobs, Employ Protection and Labor Market Performanceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn328961752en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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