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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schnedler, Wendelin | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:19:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:19:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21082 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Contract theory predicts that workers are remunerated based on all available unbiased individualperformance measures. In the real world, measures are often biased: tasks are too complex toinclude all measures, unforeseen contingencies occur for which contracts specify nothing, andthe necessity of cooperation and coordination at tasks would be undermined by purely individualmeasures. Hence, alternative incentive mechanisms are employed (implicit contracts, efficiencywages, wage profiles, tournaments). This suggests that bonus pay is linked to taskcharacteristics: complex tasks will be negatively related to bonus pay, unforeseen contingenciesand the necessity to cooperate or coordinate will be positively correlated to premiums onaggregated levels such as team or firm bonus. The present article explores these relations usinga French cross-sectional micro-data set. While complexity is found not to be negatively related tobonus pay, the other two effects are supported by the data. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x235 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Incentive schemes | en |
dc.subject.keyword | bonus pay | en |
dc.subject.keyword | three-variate probit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsorientierte Vergütung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anforderungsprofil | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Frankreich | en |
dc.title | Who gets the Reward? An Empirical Exploration of Bonus Pay and Task Characteristics | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 835522385 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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