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dc.contributor.authorSchnedler, Wendelinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:19:15Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:19:15Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21082-
dc.description.abstractContract theory predicts that workers are remunerated based on all available unbiased individual performance measures. In the real world, measures are often biased: tasks are too complex to include all measures, unforeseen contingencies occur for which contracts specify nothing, and the necessity of cooperation and coordination at tasks would be undermined by purely individual measures. Hence, alternative incentive mechanisms are employed (implicit contracts, efficiency wages, wage profiles, tournaments). This suggests that bonus pay is linked to task characteristics: complex tasks will be negatively related to bonus pay, unforeseen contingencies and the necessity to cooperate or coordinate will be positively correlated to premiums on aggregated levels such as team or firm bonus. The present article explores these relations using a French cross-sectional micro-data set. While complexity is found not to be negatively related to bonus pay, the other two effects are supported by the data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion paper series 235en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIncentive schemesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbonus payen_US
dc.subject.keywordthree-variate probiten_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwAnforderungsprofilen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen_US
dc.titleWho gets the Reward? An Empirical Exploration of Bonus Pay and Task Characteristicsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn328955108en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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