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Title:Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments PDF Logo
Authors:Jost, Peter-Jürgen
Kräkel, Matthias
Issue Date:2000
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 159
Abstract:Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
Subjects:Preemptive behavior
rank-order tournaments
sequential tournaments
JEL:J31
J33
J41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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