|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21001
|
| | |
| Title: | | Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments  |
| Authors: | | Jost, Peter-Jürgen Kräkel, Matthias |
| Issue Date: | | 2000 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion paper series 159 |
| Abstract: | | Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible. |
| Subjects: | | Preemptive behavior rank-order tournaments sequential tournaments |
| JEL: | | J31 J33 J41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
| File |
Description |
Size | Format |
| dp159.pdf | | 457.57 kB | Adobe PDF |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21001
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|