Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21001
Authors: 
Jost, Peter-Jürgen
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 159
Abstract: 
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
Subjects: 
Preemptive behavior
rank-order tournaments
sequential tournaments
JEL: 
J31
J33
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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