Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20979
Authors: 
Hart, Robert A.
Ma, Yue
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 139
Abstract: 
We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. The model is tested with the British Household Panel Survey (1991-1997) and with the British Labour Force Survey (1993/4).
Subjects: 
Lifetime wage-hours contracts
asymmetric information
estimated wage- and hourtenure profiles
JEL: 
J33
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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