Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20945
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dc.contributor.authorBrunello, Giorgioen_US
dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Claraen_US
dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:18:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:18:03Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20945-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the turnover of board of directors members in a sample of 72 companieslisted on the Milan Stock Exchange during the period 1988-1996. We investigate whetherboard members change more frequently when company performance is poor, as theliterature suggests, and whether and how the ownership structure of Italian companiesaffects these relationships. We find that there is a statistically significant and negativerelationship between firm performance and CEO turnover and that this relationship dependson the ownership structure of firms. Turnover is lower in family controlled firms and higher infirms that experienced a change in the controlling shareholder. The latter firms also have astronger turnover-performance relationship. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis thatchanges in control are an extreme form of turnover. We also find evidence of a monitoringrole of the second largest shareholder. Also the turnover of top executives exhibits anegative relationship with performance. Board turnover instead is unrelated to performancebut is related to the firm?s ownership structure. Overall our findings suggest that thecharacteristics of the Italian economy deeply affect the turnover of directors and haveimplications that go beyond the specific case study.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x105en_US
dc.subject.jelJ63en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBoard of directorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial agencyen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwVorstanden_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensentwicklungen_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleOwnership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn834517353en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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