Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20943
Authors: 
Saint-Paul, Gilles
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 639
Abstract: 
If redistribution is distortionary, and if the income of skilled workers is due to knowledgeintensive activities and depends positively on intellectual property, a social planner which cares about income distribution may in principle want to use a reduction in Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) rather than redistributive transfers. On the one hand, such a reduction reduces statis inefficiency. On the other hand, standard redistribution also reduces the level of R and D because it distorts occupational choice. We study this possibility in the context of a model with horizontal innovation, where the government, in addition to taxes and transfers, controls the fraction of innovations that are granted patents. The model predicts that standard redistribution always dominates limitations to IPRs.
Subjects: 
intellectual property rights
innovation
income distribution
inequality
redistribution
welfare state
human capital
JEL: 
O34
J31
J24
I3
H23
D3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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