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dc.contributor.authorZylberberg, Andréen_US
dc.contributor.authorCahuc, Pierreen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:17:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:17:56Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20930-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze how wage setting institutions and job-security provisions interact on unemployment. The assumption that wages are renegotiated by mutual agreement only is introduced in a matching model with endogenous job destruction – la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to get wage profiles with proper microfoundations. Then, it is shown that job protection policies influence the wage distribution and that government mandated severance transfers from employers to workers are not any more neutral, as in the standard matching model where wages are continuously renegotiated: In our framework high redundancy transfers influence employment. Moreover, the assumption of enegotiation by mutual agreement allows us to introduce a minimum wage in a coherent way, and to study its interactions with job protection policies. Our computational exercises suggest that redundancy transfers and administrative dismissal restrictions have negligeable unemployment effects when wages are flexible or when the minimum wage is low, but a dramatic positive impact on unemployment when there is a high minimum wage.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion paper series 95en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelH29en_US
dc.subject.jelJ23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ38en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordjob protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.subject.keywordmatching modelsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenegotiationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitszeitflexibilisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleJob Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemploymenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn311993818en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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