Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20909
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 74
Abstract: 
This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser?s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.
Subjects: 
Economies of scope
free-rider effect
mismatch
teams
tournament
JEL: 
J44
J41
D21
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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