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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20909
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| Title: | | Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams  |
| Authors: | | Kräkel, Matthias |
| Issue Date: | | 1999 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion paper series 74 |
| Abstract: | | This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser?s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching. |
| Subjects: | | Economies of scope free-rider effect mismatch teams tournament |
| JEL: | | J44 J41 D21 C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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