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Title:Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams PDF Logo
Authors:Kräkel, Matthias
Issue Date:1999
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 74
Abstract:This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser?s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.
Subjects:Economies of scope
free-rider effect
mismatch
teams
tournament
JEL:J44
J41
D21
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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