Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20749 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1450
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favorable economic institutions ensure the appropriability of rents in form of a state of law. We study the conditions under which a state of law can be implemented under oligarchy, and when democratization is necessary. Inequality in endowments and incomes prolongs the absence of good institutions and delays democratization. Conversely, institutions shape the income distribution. Simulations illustrate how inequality affects the development process and may lead to overtaking and divergence. The implications are in line with historical and empirical evidence.
Schlagwörter: 
inequality
democratization
institutions
state of law
long-term development
JEL: 
N10
O20
H10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
462.01 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.