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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20686
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lundberg, Shelly | en |
dc.contributor.author | Startz, Richard | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:15:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:15:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20686 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents several economic models that explore the relationships betweenimperfect information, racial income disparities, and segregation. The use of race as a signalarises here, as in models of statistical discrimination, from imperfect information about thereturn to transactions with particular agents. In a search framework, signaling supports notsimply a discriminatory equilibrium, but a pattern of racially segregated transactions, which inturn perpetuates the informational asymmetries. Minority groups necessarily sufferdisproportionately from segregation, since the degree to which transactions opportunities arecurtailed depends upon group size, as well as the informational ?distance? between racialgroups. However, in some variants of the model, minority agents will self-segregate sincethey face an adverse selection of majority agents who are willing to trade with them. We alsoshow that, if agents are able to learn from transactions, racial signaling can emerge with onlyminimal assumptions about the ex ante importance of race. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1389 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J7 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | race | en |
dc.subject.keyword | segregation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | discrimination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | imperfect information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | search | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohndifferenzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ethnische Diskriminierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Segregation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Suchtheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollkommene Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ethnische Beziehungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Information and Racial Exclusion | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 47632341X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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